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Abstract
Background: Several countries recently reassessed the roles of drug prescribing and dispensing, either by enlarging
pharmacists’ rights to prescribe (e.g. the US and the United Kingdom) or by limiting physicians’ rights to dispense
(e.g. Taiwan and South Korea). While integrating the two roles might increase supply and be convenient for
patients, concern is that drug mark-ups incite providers to prescribe unnecessary drugs. We aimed to assess the
association of physician dispensing (PD) in Switzerland on various outcomes.
Methods: We performed a retrospective cohort study, using health care claims data for patients in the year 2013.
The analysis of the association of PD was perfomed using a large patient level dataset and several target variables,
including the number of different chemical agents, share of generic drugs, number of visits to physicians and
expenditures. Different multivariate econometric models were applied in order to capture the association PD on
the target variables.
Results: A total of 101’784 patients were enrolled in 2013, whereas 54 % were PD patients. We find that PD is
associated with lower pharmaceutical expenditure per patient, which can be explained by an increased use of
generic drugs. The decrease is compensated by higher use of physician services. We find no significant impact
of physician dispensing on total health care expenditure.
Conclusions: Our study offers insights for policy makers who are (re-)considering the separation between drug
prescribing and dispensing, either by allowing physicians to dispense or pharmacists to prescribe certain drugs.
In terms of total health care expenditures, we find no difference between the two systems, so we are doubtful
that changing dispensing rights are a good measure to contain cost, at least in Switzerland.
Keywords: Prescription drugs, Physician dispensing, Health care expenditures
Background
Access to high quality drug prescriptions and drug
supply are major issues in ambulatory care. In this
context, many countries have recently reassessed the
roles of pharmacists and physicians. Countries such as
the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom, who face a
shortage of primary care providers, have enlarged
pharmacist’s rights to dispense, effectively integrating the
two roles (Latter et al. [1], Abramowitz et al. [2]). While
integration might be convenient for patients, concern is
that drug mark-ups raise well known problems such as
provider-induced-demand (PID) (e.g. Arrow [3]).
In South East Asia, the two roles were traditionally
integrated as physicians prescribed and dispensed drugs.
Recent policy reforms in many countries (e.g. South
Korea, Taiwan, Japan and China) aimed at a stricter
separation (Eggleston [4]). A number of empirical
studies support the notion that PID is a problem. For
example, Iizuka et al. [5] find that mark-ups significantly
influence the choice of anti-hypertensive drugs by
Japanese physicians and using the cheapest drugs could
markedly reduce drug expenditures. Chou et al. [6] find
that Taiwanese physicians who no longer earned drug* Correspondence: oliver.reich@helsana.ch
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mark-ups decreased both the frequency of a prescription
and the prescribed volume.
The Swiss experience with prescribing and dispensing
is quite unique. Drug dispensing is regulated on the can-
tonal (‘state’) level and some parts of the country have a
long tradition with physician dispensing (PD) while
other cantons strictly separate the two roles. In the can-
tons that allow dispensing, physicians gain considerable
income from this activity. Research from Hunkeler [7]
estimates that dispensing primary care physicians on
average earn 28 % of their income from drug mark-ups.
For dispensing specialists, 7 % of earnings come from
dispensing.
The Swiss empirical literature focused on the effects of
PD on health care expenditure and reports surprisingly
contradictory findings. Several studies have analyzed
physician dispensing using aggregate cantonal data, which
has the disadvantage that sample sizes are small (there
are only 26 cantons). Beck et al. [8] relate per-capita drug
expenditure to physician dispensing regulation and other
characteristics of cantons and find that PD is associated
with a strong increase in drug expenditures. In their data,
pharmaceutical expenditures are assigned to the canton
of the provider’s location and divided by the cantonal
population to calculate average cost per head. There is a
substantial outlier in this data because a small canton
(«Thurgau») hosts a large mail order drug store serving
many non-local patients. Because Thurgau is a PD canton
and the sample size for regression is small, this outlier
might influence the coefficient of PD upwardly. Using a
panel data approach, Reich et al. [9] find a small positive
effect of PD on health care expenditures (HCE). A diffe-
rent result was obtained by an earlier study perfomed by
Vatter et al. [10], who identify a significantly negative
effect of the share of PD providers on per capita HCE.
More surprisingly still, Schleiniger et al. [11] estimate a
significantly negative effect of PD on drug expenditure.
Their data is similar to that of Beck et al. [8], but expen-
ditures are assigned to patient location instead of provider
location. Still, the small sample size might mean that
regression results are influenced by outliers.
Other studies used physician level data to analyze the
effects of dispensing. The results estimated by Busato et
al. [12] illustrate that PD is associated with lower phy-
sician expenditure in primary care and some (but not all)
specialties. Focusing on dispensing general practitioners
(GP) and specialist physicians, two recent studies by
Kaiser et al. [13] (only specialist physicians) and Burkhard
et al. [14] find that dispensing physicians have markedly
higher drug cost per patient than their non-dispensing
colleagues. With data on the physician level, the implica-
tion of these results on total health care expenditure
remain unclear. Indeed, patients who see many physicians
have lower expenditures per physician than a loyal patient
who see only one physician. In addition, it is challenging
to control for practice size in these studies. Physicians
with large patient panels may play a strong role in the
provision of services for their communities and therefore
prescribe more, regardless of the PD status (Kaiser et al.
[13] don’t control for this, Burkhard et al. [14] don’t report
whether they do).
Rischatsch et al. [15] analyzed the choice between
generic and brand-name drugs and find that generic
substitution is more common in the PD market than in
the pharmacy based system. Exploiting the small area
variation in Switzerland, Fillipini et al. [16] find that PD
is associated with slightly higher use of antibiotic drugs.
Finally, Blozik et al. [17] looked at the frequency of
potentially inappropriate medications (PIM) among eld-
erly patients and find that it is more frequent in the PD
than in the pharmacy sector.
As there is no consensus in the literature about the
size or even the sign of the association between PD and
health care expenditure in Switzerland, further research
on the topic is necessary. This study sheds new light on
the issue by analyzing individual patient data from the
canton of Zurich, which is the most inhabited canton in
Switzerland. We expect dispensing rights to influence
drug prescribing behaviour and the supply of other
physician services, so we analyze a set of different target
variables, such as drug quantities, share of generic drugs,
number of visit to physicians and physician expendi-
tures. In addition, we analyze the impact of PD on total
health care expenditure, which is of considerable interest
for health policy. Using patient level data allows us not
only to control for a wide range of individual characte-
ristics but also to follow the patient through different
parts of the health care system, assessing the total amount
of resources used for her treatment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 contains a description of the policy setting and
ambulatory care in Switzerland. In section 3, we formu-
late hypotheses on the influence of PD on physician
behaviour and derive a testing strategy. The data and the
econometric specifications are described in section 4.
Section 5 discusses estimation results while section 6
rounds off with a summary and conclusions.
Policy setting
Ambulatory care in Switzerland
Ambulatory care in Switzerland is mostly provided by
private for-profit physicians and pharmacists. Their
services are mainly funded by mandatory insurance, with
patients paying deductibles and cost-sharing up to a
maximum per year. Patients can choose freely among all
licensed physicians and pharmacists. Insurers are obliged
to reimburse consultation fees to physicians according
to a nationwide fee-for-service schedule that is collectively
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bargained between the providers’ and the insurers’ asso-
ciation. Pharmacists receive consultations fees for advising
patients on their drug therapy. In addition, pharmacists
and dispensing physicians earn drug mark-ups. Drug
prices are regulated by the Federal Office for Public
Health and patients (or their insurers) generally pay the
same price whether they buy from physicians or at phar-
macies. Mark-ups are fixed as the difference between the
regulated ex-factory price and the consumer price. Still,
there is room for negotiations on drug mark-ups as physi-
cians and pharmacists get rebates on regulated ex-factory
prices. Rebates are more common in the generic market,
because different producers compete for market share.
Physician dispensing (PD)
PD is regulated at the cantonal (“state”) level, and a
variety of regulations can be observed within Switzerland
(see [13] for a review). In French and Italian speaking
regions, PD is unknown except in emergencies and for
special treatment options. In the German speaking re-
gions, only one canton (Basel-City) has such a rigid regu-
lation. Many of the remaining cantons allow physicians to
dispense on their own account, while some others apply
mixed systems. In all the cantons that allow physician
dispensing, patients have a right to ask physicians for
written prescriptions and fill them at the pharmacy of
their choice. Several cantons oblige dispensing physicians
to explicitly inform patients about this right.
Hypotheses and testing strategy
Hypotheses
In this section, we formulate hypotheses about how PD
might influence the decision making of physicians. The
first aspect that comes to mind is drug quantities. Dis-
pensing physicians earn positive drug mark-ups, so their
prescription decisions can be seen as «self-referrals», a
term used to describe referrals to resources (partly)
owned by the treating physician (Mitchell and Scott
[18]). The theory of «physician induced demand» (PID),
originally formulated by Evans [19], states that phy-
sicians might tilt their patients’ demand curve towards
services that lie in their own interest. Physicians are able
to do this because they know much more about the
possibilities and consequences of treatment and often
take medical decisions on the patients’ behalf (physician
agency, Arrow [3]). It is important to note that demand
inducement only occurs if the physician advises services
against his or her own interpretation of the patients’ best
interest. Shifting demand towards the patients’ optimum,
the physician does his or her job as the patient’s perfect
agent. Although the PID-hypothesis is debated in the
health economic literature (Feldman and Sloan [20]),
there is a substantial body of literature which shows that
physician ownership influences medical decisions (see
Johnson [21] for a review). Building on this line of
research, we test the hypothesis that PD leads to increased
drug quantities. The second aspect is drug prices. The
prices that patients or their insurers pay are regulated to
be equal at pharmacists or physicians for the same pro-
duct. Still, differences occur if there are different treat-
ment options available – for example brand-name and
generic drugs. The study of Rischatsch et al. [15] found
that dispensing physicians dispense more (cheaper) gen-
eric drugs than pharmacies do. The authors offer two
explanations for this: First, dispensing physicians are likely
to be better informed about drug prices than non-
dispensing physicians and might prescribe more generics
to save the patient money. Second, dispensing physicians
are likely to earn higher mark-ups for generic drugs
because of generous rebates on ex-factory prices. With
high competition in the generic market, producers give
these rebates in order to gain market share. We believe
that both of the factors reported by Rischatsch et al. [15]
could influence prescribing decisions and test the hypo-
thesis that physician dispensing leads to lower drug prices.
For consultation services, physicians are remunerated
by fee-for-service (see also «policy setting»). PD can be
seen as an increase in the fee per visit because phy-
sicians earn additional drug mark-ups (bearing in mind
that drug prescriptions are frequent during outpatient
visits). In the health economics literature, the effects of a
fee increase on quantities is debated. Standard micro-
economic theory predicts that producers increase supply
when (relative) prices are high, and there is evdience
that this applies to outpatient medical care (Clemens
and Gottlieb [22]). However, the «target income hypo-
thesis» of physician behaviour predicts that lower fees
lead to more services, at least in the short run when the
number of suppliers is constant (see e.g. Nguyen and
Derrick [23]). Because physicians in Switzerland have
other (profitable) options than providing outpatient
consultations and PD has been known for a long time,
we believe that the former argument is more convincing
and test the hypothesis that PD increases the supply of
physician services, especially in primary care where the
additional income from PD is substantial [7]. We also
believe that physicians are in a strong position to influ-
ence demand. For example, dispensing physicians might
write less long-term prescriptions than other physicians.
Long-term prescriptions are usually filled by pharmacies,
leading to forgone income from drug dispensing. In this
case, PD-patients on long-term drug therapy will need
to visit physicians more often. Table 1 illustrates the
study hypotheses.
Testing strategy
In order to tests these hypotheses, we analyze a set of
different target variables (see Table 2). To approximate
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drug quantities (hypothesis 1), we analyze the number of
different active agents that were dispensed to patients
during the observation period. As an indicator of drug
prices, we analyze a [0/1]-indicator whether the patient
used generic drugs for more than 50 % of her drug
expenditures. We expect a positive influence of PD
(hypothesis 2). In addition, we also analyze the effects of
PD on drug expenditure per patient. As PD is expected
to increase drug quantities and lower drug prices, we do
not have a clear expectation on how PD should affect
drug expenditures.
Turning now to physician services, hypothesis 3 states
PD is associated with more consultations per patient.
We expect this increase to be stronger in primary care
than in specialist care, because drug dispensing is more
influential on the income of primary care physicians. As
the number of consultations increases, we also expect an
increase in the expenditures for physician services.
We also analyze the effect of PD on total health care
expenditure, because this variable is of considerable




As not all physicians legally entitled to dispense choose
to do so, legal status is a poor measure of dispensing
activities in the market. Using a data-driven approach
instead, we define a physician as dispensing when the
following two conditions are fullfilled: First, the physician
prescribed drugs worth more than Swiss Francs (CHF)
12,500 in the 6-month observation period. Second, the
physician dispensed more than half of the drugs he or
she prescribed. This definition was used in previous work
by Helsana insurance company and Hunkeler [7].
For the analysis of patient level data, we define a
patient as PD-patient if he or she received 50 or more
percent of his or her drugs (measured by pharmaceutical
expenditure turnover) from a dispensing physician. For
most of the patients in the dataset, the share of physician-
dispensed pharmaceuticals was either very high, or very
low, so the choice of cut-off point does not influence the
results (see the distribution in Fig. 1).
Data and descriptive statistics
We use a large dataset of individual claims from the year
2013 covering the period 1.1.2013 to 30.6.2013, which
was provided by Helsana, a large health insurance com-
pany. Claims files contained information on the enrollees’
age, sex, health insurance plan, health expenditure and
utilization, and prescribed drugs including the ingredients
as defined by the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
(ATC) code from the WHO. The pharmaceutical expen-
ditures are either induced directly from the dispensing
physician or indirectly from prescriptions filled in com-
munity pharmacies. Several restrictions were made to the
data: First, we excluded enrollees with no pharmaceutical
spending during the observation period on the grounds
that we cannot distinguish PD and non-PD patients if no
drugs were bought. Second, we excluded patients who
received more than 20 % of their prescriptions from
physicians working in hospitals. Although hospitals are
important agents in the health care market, they are not
in the focus of our study. Third, we also excluded
children under the age of 18 years, because physicians
always dispense some of the children’s medicines (such
as vaccines), which could confound the effects of PD.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. The dataset
includes 101,784 patients, 54 % of which are PD
patients. PD patients are slightly older on average than
non-PD patients. The share of people with high deduc-
tibles is slightly lower among PD than among non-PD
patients. Still, PD patients had lower total health care
cost on average in the previous year.
The strongest difference between PD and non-PD
patients is found regarding the type of municipalities.
Non-PD patients often live in urban centres, while PD
patients are more likely to be in suburban municipalities.
Still, it is important to note that the whole canton of
Zurich is quite densely populated and access to medical
services is high everywhere.
The target variables are shown in the bottom third of
Table 3. For target variables like pharmaceutical expen-
ditures and total health care expenditures, we observe
Table 1 Overview of hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: PD increases drug quantities
Hypothesis 2: PD increases the use of generic drugs,
resulting in lower drug prices.
Hypothesis 3: PD increases the supply of physician consultations,
notably by primary care physicians
Table 2 Overview of target variables and expected influence
of physician dispensing (PD)
Variable Expected sign of
PD-variable
Number of different active agents per patient +
Share of generic drugs +
Drug expenditure unclear
Number of visits to general practitioner +
Number of visits to specialists +
Physician expenditure +
Total health care expenditure unclear
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very high standard errors, which is typically observed
with health data. PD patients have lower pharmaceutical
expenditure on average than non-PD patients, and a
higher share of generic drugs. PD patients have a higher
number of consultations by GPs but a lower number of
visits to specialists than non-PD patients.
Econometric methods
In this study we aim to compare patients that receive drugs
predominately from physicians to patients who receive
drugs at the pharmacy. Using a comprehensive patient-level
dataset, we are confident that we are able to control for
many relevant differences in patient populations. Variables
Fig. 1 (Bimodal) Distribution of physician-dispensed drug expenditure per patient
Table 3 Characteristics patients in physician dispensing (PD) group versus non-PD group, year 2013
Non-PD PD p-value
N 46,445 55,339
Control variables, observed on 1.1.2013 [means and standard deviation or in %]
Age 55.4 (19.02) 57.6 (19.37) 0.0***
Share of females 0.61 % 0.57 % 0.0***
Share of high deductibles 0.22 % 0.21 % 0.0***
Standard contract (non-managed care) 0.59 % 0.57 % 0.0***
Health care expenditure in previous year in Swiss francs 5,204 (8,516) 4,818 (8,704) 0.0***
Agricultural-mixed municipalities 0.4 % 1.2 % 0.0***
Agricultural municipalities 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0***
Affluent municipalities 7.8 % 10.2 % 0.0***
Touristic municipalities 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.0***
Industrial and tertiary municipalities 1.3 % 3.1 % 0.0***
Rural commuting municipalities 1.0 % 2.5 % 0.0***
Periurban municipalities 5.5 % 14.0 % 0.0***
Suburban municipalities 25.4 % 53.6 % 0.0***
Urban centers 58.5 % 15.2 % 0.0***
Target variables, observed 1.1.2013 - 30.06.2013
Pharmaceutical expenditure per patient in Swiss francs 538 (1,299) 469 (1,031) 0.0***
Share of generic drugs 19.3 % 24.6 % 0.0***
Number of different active agents per patient 5.40 5.68 0.0***
Number of GP visits per patient 2.73 3.13 0.0***
Number of specialist visits per patient 2.80 2.13 0.0***
Physician expenditure per patient in Swiss francs 816 (1,217) 753 (1,513) 0.0***
Health care expenditure per patient in Swiss francs 2,559 (4,536) 2,406 (4,876) 0.0***
Source: Claims data from Helsana insurance company, own calculations, Standard deviations in parentheses
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potentially related to the choice of the physician and there-
fore the dispensing status could not be included in the
analysis due to data availability. On the physician side, we
control for specialty only because more detailed data on
physicians was not available. Hence, this study cannot
investigate the determinants driving the dispensing choice
of the physician. This part is unique and ought to be
considered in further research.
The different target variables discussed in section 3
call for different econometric specifications (see Table 4).
The [0/1]-indicator variable of drug prices (more than
50 % of generics) was estimated by a logit model. For the
continuous, non-negative numbers like drug cost and total
cost, we used a glm specification with a log link and a
gamma-type variance structure. The log-link was chosen
because the distribution of this variable is highly skewed
to the right. The Park test suggested by Manning et al.
[24] indicated that even on the log scale, the error
variance grew proportionally with the fitted values, so we
used the ‘gamma family’ specification.
The cost for physician services are a continuous
variable as well, but have a high share of zero values
(about 10 %). Therefore, we use the two-part model
proposed by Duan et al. [25]. On the first part, the
probability of using any care is estimated by a probit
model. On the second stage, the cost for patients with
positive cost is estimated by a glm specification with a
log link and a gamma-type variance structure.
Last but not least, variables like the number of phy-
sician visits or the number of different active agents take
on non-negative discrete values (including zero). This
calls for a specification using a ‘count data’ model like
poisson or negative binominal regression. In order to
choose between these models, we apply the test for
over-dispersion suggested by Cameron et al. ([26], p. 671).
The result shows that overdispersion is a problem and
therefore we choose the negative binomial specification.
In non-linear models such as logit or two-part models,
the marginal effect of an independent variable on the
outcome variable depends on the values of all control
variables Norton et al. [27]. One could calculate the
marginal effects at a specific point of the distribution, for
example at sample means. In our case, most of the control
variables are categorical, and some of them are strongly
correlated, so sample means might give misleading results.
We therefore assess the marginal effects for each indi-
vidual and average them. The individual marginal effects
are calculated by estimating the fitted values twice, first
while assuming that all patients were PD patients, second
while assuming all patients where non-PD patients. The
sample average marginal effect was calculated. Standard
errors were obtained by bootstrapping, ie drawing with
replacement 1000 samples of equal size (50,000 patients).
Results and discussion
Drugs
Hypothesis 1 states that PD is associated with increased
drug quantities. As shown in Table 5 (column 1), this
seems to be the case for the number of active agents per
patient. The coefficient of the PD variable is significantly
positive and indicates that PD leads to a 2.5 % increase
in the number of different active agents. The mean mar-
ginal effect amounts to 0.13 units per patient, meaning
that roughly one in eight PD patients on average is pre-
scribed an additional chemical agent. This finding is in
line with previous research [16] which reported higher
drug quantities in areas with many PD physicians.
Hypothesis 2 is related to the share of generic drugs.
The odds ratio of the PD variable is greater than 1 (see
second column of Table 5), showing that PD patients
receive more generic drugs than otherwise similar non-
PD patients. The average marginal effect amounts to 3.6
percentage points. Our results replicate the finding of
Rischatsch et al. [15] who also show that PD is asso-
ciated with an increased use of generics.
The control variables reveal that older and sicker pa-
tients have a lower probability of using generic drugs,
while males, and patients with high deductibles or
managed-care type contracts have a higher probability of
using them. There is a strong negative effect of using
generics in affluent and (sub-)urban communities, which
might indicate lower price sensitivity and/or a stronger
preference for well-known brands among wealthier and
more urban patients.
Results for pharmaceutical expenditures are shown in
the third column of Table 5. PD patients are found to
spend about 7 % less on pharmaceuticals relative to
otherwise similar non-PD patients. Existing studies on the
relation between PD and drug expenditures used either
cantonal or physician-level data and found different
results. The most recent study is by Kaiser et al. [13] who
Table 4 Target variables and model specifications
Variable Type Specification
No. of different active agents count data negative binominal
Share of generic drugs binominal variable logit





No. of visits gp count negative binominal
No. of visits specialists count negative binominal
Total health care cost continuous glm, log link,
gamma variance
Control variables: Age, gender, deductibles, expenditure in previous year,
number of hospital visits/stays, 22 pharmaceutical cost groups to
indicate illness
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find a strongly positive association of PD with drug expen-
ditures prescribed by specialists. The discrepancy might
be related to the fact that roughly 60 % of the pharma-
ceutical spending was prescribed by GPs in the canton of
Zurich in 2013 and this was not analysed by previous
mentioned study [13]. However, the study performed by
Burkhard et al. [14] suggests that physician dispensing
leads to an increase of drug costs of 25 % for general
practitioners and 15 % for specialists. The reason for
the differing results may be attributed to the definition
of a dispensing physician. The prior mentioned studies
identify each physician by using the dispensing permi-
ssion issued by the respective cantonal authorities. As
not all physicians legally entitled to dispense actually
use their permission in daily pratice, our definition utilized
in this study may lead to different findings. In addition,
results on the physician level may differ from results on
the patient level if PD- and Non-PD-patients don’t show
the same level of loyalty to their physicians. Using patient-
level data, this study sheds new light on the issue by
analyzing the association of PD on total drug expenditure
per patient independently of the provider.
The control variables mostly have the expected signs.
Pharmaceutical expenditures are higher for older patients,
patients with hospital visits/stays, and patients predo-
minately treated by specialists. Patients with high deduc-
tibles or managed-care type contracts have lower expected
expenditures than other patients. The type-of-municipality
Table 5 Results of the multivariate regression analysis of the impact of physician dispensing (PD) on drug utilization
Target variable Number of different
active agents




Specification Glm, log link,
negative binom. Family




PD 1.025(0.004)*** 1.245(0.023)*** 0.928 (0.011)*** 0.86 (0.01)***
Age 1.002(0)*** 0.995(0.001)*** 1.004 (0)*** 1.004 (0)***
Gender =m 0.957(0.003)*** 1.18(0.02)*** 1.107 (0.013)*** 1.111 (0.013)***
PPO-contract 1.022(0.006)*** 0.992(0.031) 0.944 (0.019). 0.941 (0.019)**
Telemedicine contract 0.973(0.005)*** 0.994(0.026) 0.949 (0.017)*** 0.942 (0.016)***
HMO contract 0.996(0.004) 1.123(0.022)*** 0.935 (0.012)*** 0.927 (0.012)***
High deductible 0.871(0.004)*** 1.123(0.023)*** 0.803 (0.011)*** 0.801 (0.011)***
Cost in previous year (log) 1.049(0.001)*** 0.936(0.004)*** 1.171 (0.003)*** 1.170 (0.003)***
Nursing home stay 0.989(0.008) 0.962(0.063) 0.960 (0.033)* 0.968 (0.033)
Outpatient hospital visits 1-5 1.184(0.004)*** 0.846(0.019)*** 1.151 (0.016)*** 1.150 (0.016)***
Outpatient hospital visits > 5 1.182(0.009)*** 0.81(0.045)*** 1.198 (0.038)*** 1.201 (0.037)***
Inpatient stay in hospital 1.066(0.006)*** 0.782(0.032)*** 1.081 (0.025)*** 1.085 (0.024)***
Prescriptions psychiatrists 0.907(0.01) *** 1.125(0.065)* 1.814 (0.069)*** 1.775 (0.066)***
Prescriptions cardio-/angiologists 1.002(0.034) 0.603(0.099)** 1.163 (0.125)* 1.132 (0.119)***
Prescriptions gynaeologists 1.091(0.01)*** 0.311(0.016)*** 1.283 (0.035)*** 1.279 (0.034)***
Prescriptions other specialists 1.132(0.006)*** 0.478(0.013)*** 1.865 (0.032)*** 1.821 (0.03)***
Agricultural municipalities 1.067(0.147) 0.638(0.377) 1.005 (0.415) 1.012 (0.408)
Affluent municipalities 1.067(0.147) 0.573(0.049)*** 0.954 (0.058) 0.96 (0.057)
Industrial and tertiary municipalities 1.064(0.019)*** 0.917(0.086) 0.949 (0.064) 0.95 (0.063)
Rural commuting municipalities 1.048(0.021)* 0.825(0.08)* 1.002 (0.069) 1.002 (0.068)
Periurban municipalities 1.016(0.021) 0.813(0.068)* 0.952 (0.057) 0.956 (0.056)
Suburban municipalities 1.019(0.018) 0.691(0.056)*** 0.934 (0.055) 0.941 (0.054)
Touristic municipalities 1.052(0.018)** 0.883(0.195) 0.644 (0.095) 0.649 (0.094)**
Urban centers 0.961(0.044) 0.774(0.063)** 0.882 (0.052) 0.896 (0.052)








Target variable per patient, first 6 months of year 2013. Exponential of coefficients [exp(̂β)] displayed
Standard errors calculated by the delta method [seexp(β) = exp(β)] ∗ seβ, displayed in parentheses
Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Source: Claims data from Helsana insurance company, own calculations
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variables turn out to be insignificant. After controlling for
several indicators of utilization and choice of provider, the
location of the patient seems not to be influential on
pharmaceutical spending.
The fourth column of Table 5 shows the same esti-
mation, but includes consultation fees for pharmacists in
the calculation. These fees are paid to pharmacists for
the dispensing of prescription drugs, and are part of the
pharmaceutical bill. Physicians ‘consultation fees’ do not
show on the pharmaceutical bill and will be analyzed in
the next section. If consulting fees for pharmacists are
added to pharmaceutical expenditure, PD patients have
lower expenditures by even about 14 %, relative to
comparable non-PD patients.
Physician services
In hypothesis 3 we stated that PD is likely to increase
the supply of physician consultations. As shown in the
first line of Table 6, this hypothesis cannot be rejected
either. PD is associated with a higher number of visits to
physicians. Contrary to our expectations, the association
on GP care is not stronger than on specialist care. Cal-
culating the marginal effects, we find that PD increases
the expected number of GP visits by 0.122 visits per
patient and the expected number of visits to specialists
by 0.086 visits per patient. Kaiser et al. [13] also analyzed
the impact of PD on visits to specialists and find similar
effects (a plus of 0.067 or 0.081 visits per patient, depen-
ding on the specification).
Table 6 Results of the multivariate regression analysis of the impact of physician dispensing (PD) on physician services




Specification Glm, log link negative
binom. fam.
Glm, log link negative
binom. fam.
Probit Glm, log link
gamma family
PD 1.05 (0.008)*** 1.065 (0.01)*** 0.444 (0.014)*** 1.02 (0.087)*
Age 1.002 (0)*** 0.997 (0)*** −0.004 (0)*** 1.003 (0)***
Gender =m 0.955 (0.006)*** 0.826 (0.008)*** −0.12 (0.013)*** 0.95 (0.008)***
PPO-contract 1.043 (0.012)*** 1.001 (0.017) 0.072 (0.025)** 0.989 (0.014)
Telemedicine contract 1 (0.011) 1.055 (0.015)*** 0.065 (0.02)** 1.022 (0.013)
HMO contract 1.032 (0.008)*** 0.988 (0.011) 0.114 (0.016)*** 0.981 (0.009)*
High deductible 0.882 (0.008)*** 0.864 (0.01)*** −0.14 (0.015)*** 0.921 (0.009)***
Cost in previous year (log) 1.06 (0.002)*** 1.153 (0.003)*** 0.649 (0.053)*** 1.447 (0.022)***
Nursing home stay 1.334 (0.016)*** - 0.044 (0.003)*** 1.068 (0.002)***
Outpatient hospital vistis 1-5 0.889 (0.016)*** 1.559 (0.026)*** 0.339 (0.063)*** 0.777 (0.018)***
Outpatient hospital vistis >5 1.313 (0.01)*** 1.365 (0.015)*** 0.406 (0.021)*** 1.313 (0.012)***
Inpatient stay in hospital 1.303 (0.021)*** 1.259 (0.029)*** 0.314 (0.055)*** 1.238 (0.026)***
Prescriptions psychiatrists 0.409 (0.03)*** 4.687 (0.362)*** 0.238 (0.048)*** 3.488 (0.091)***
Prescriptions cardio-/angiologists 0.278 (0.006)*** 4.445 (0.091)*** −0.017 (0.102) 2.815 (0.221)***
Prescriptions gynaeologists 0.405 (0.01)*** 10.156 (0.266)*** 0.012 (0.029) 1.707 (0.033)***
Prescriptions other specialists 0.347 (0.004)*** 5.582 (0.072)*** 0.211 (0.02)*** 2.25 (0.027)***
Agricultural municipalities 0.821 (0.198) 1.45 (0.554) 0.153 (0.411) 1.06 (0.309)
Industrial and tertiary municipalities 0.921 (0.221) 1.533 (0.583) 0.114 (0.075) 1.011 (0.048)
Rural commuting municipalities 0.903 (0.217) 1.579 (0.601) 0.071 (0.077) 1.054 (0.051)
Touristic municipalities 0.742 (0.189) 1.49 (0.587) 0.094 (0.154) 1.123 (0.117)
Affluent municipalities 0.959 (0.229) 1.948 (0.739) 0.228 (0.067)*** 1.221 (0.052)***
Periurban municipalities 0.893 (0.213) 1.645 (0.624) 0.062 (0.066) 1.091 (0.046)*
Suburban municipalities 0.918 (0.219) 1.733 (0.657) 0.138 (0.064)* 1.123 (0.046)**
Urban centers 1.011 (0.242) 1.942 (0.736) 0.34 (0.064)*** 1.249 (0.052)***








Target variable per patient, first 6 months of year 2013. Exponential of coefficients [exp(̂β)] displayed in columns 1,2,4
Standard errors calculated by the delta method [ŝexp(β) = exp(β) ∗ ŝβ], displayed in parentheses
Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Source: Claims data from Helsana insurance company, own calculations
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In column three and four of 6, results are reported for
physician expenditures, which are modelled by a two-part
model. The influence of the PD variable is quite sizeable
and strongly significant in the first part, meaning that PD
increases the probability of using physician services. Once
the use is initiated, expenditures are estimated to be 2 %
higher for PD patients than for non-PD patients. Putting
the two parts of the model together, we estimate PD
patients on average to have 6.5 % higher expenditure
(Swiss francs 50.80) for physician services than compa-
rable non-PD patients. Busato et al. [12] analyzed the ef-
fect of PD on the expenditures for different physician
groups and find PD to be associated with higher cost for
some groups of specialists but not for primary care physi-
cians, pediatric physicians, gynecologists and psychiatrists.
However, their results are not directly comparable to ours
as they use data from different cantons, and different
cantons also have different prices for physician services.
Total health care expenditures
The association of PD on total health care expenditure
is not statistically significant (see Table 7). Two other ar-
ticles addressing the question of PD and total health care
expenditure are Reich et al. [9] who find a small positive
effect of PD on expenditure and an older study by Vatter
et al. [10] who find a small negative effect.
Still, it cannot be judged whether the enlargement of
physician dispensing rights is beneficial for patients by
analyzing expenditures only. To that regard, an analysis of
treatment quality would be necessary, which is beyond the
scope of this study. Recent evidence by Blozik et al. [17]
showed that the probability of receiving a prescription of
potentially inadequate medication among elderly patients
is higher in the PD sector than in the non-PD sector. Fi-
nally, Table 8 illustrates and summarizes the coefficients
and the according confidence intervals for the relationship
between PD and the target variables.
Robustness checks
We checked for the robustness of the results by apply-
ing several alternative calculations. First, we excluded
the 5 % of patients with the highest drug expenditures
from the calculations because rare, expensive drugs
might be affected by PD in a different manner than ‘high
volume’ drugs. Second, we excluded all patients who were
treated by oncologist or rheumatologists. Several modern
drugs in these specialties are administered directly to the
patients, so most physicians in these specialties are dis-
pensing some drugs (and earn their markups) due to the
fact that the pharmacy is not an option. The results from
these two tests remained within the confidence intervals
of the results reported in section 5.
As a third test, we analyzed the impact of PD in two
other cantons, Lucerne, which has a very high share of
dispensing physicians and Argovia, where only a small
Table 7 Results of the multivariate regression analysis of the
impact of physician dispensing (PD) on total health care
expenditures
Specification Glm, log link gamma family
PD 0.989 (0.008)
Age 1.005 (0)***
Gender =m 0.977 (0.007)**
PPO-contract 0.953 (0.012)***
Telemedicine contract 0.996 (0.011)
HMO contract 0.965 (0.008)***
High deductible 0.87 (0.008)***
Nursing home stay 3.126 (0.069)***
Outpatient hospital visits 1-5 1.783 (0.016)***
Outpatient hospital visits >5 2.427 (0.048)***
Inpatient stay in hospital 4.003 (0.058)***
Cost in past year (log) 1.117 (0.002)***
Prescriptions psychiatrists 2.252 (0.054)***
Prescriptions cardio-/angiologists 1.614 (0.109)***
Prescriptions gynaeologists 1.488 (0.026)***
Prescriptions other specialists 1.78 (0.019)***
Agricultural municipalities 1.03 (0.268)
Affluent municipalities 1.074 (0.041)
Industrial and tertiary municipalities 0.977 (0.042)
Rural commuting municipalities 1.004 (0.044)
Periurban municipalities 1.025 (0.039)
Suburban municipalities 1.022 (0.038)
Touristic municipalities 0.946 (0.088)
Urban centers 1.079 (0.04)*
22 pharmaceutical cost groups all coefficients strongly positive
Target variable per patient, first 6 months of year 2013. Exponential of
coefficients [exp(̂β)] displayed
Standard errors calculated by the delta method [ŝexp(β) = exp(β) ∗ ŝβ], displayed
in parentheses
Significance levels: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Source: Claims data from Helsana insurance company, own calculations
Table 8 Coefficent and confidence interval for the relationship
between PD and target variables
Variable Coefficients CI: 2.5 % CI : 97.5 %
Total health care expenditures 0.989 0.974 1.004
Probability of a physician visit 0.444 0.416 0.472




Pharmaceutical expenditure 0.928 0.906 0.95
Number of GP visits 1.05 1.035 1.065
Number of specialist visits 1.065 1.045 1.086
Source: Claims data from Helsana insurance company, own calculations
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portion of the physicians dispense. We expect that possible
selection problems on the physician side are less accen-
tuated between regions because many physicians have
local ties. With respect to the associations of PD, the
results we obtained in these two cantons had the same
signs and significance levels and were of comparable size
as those in Zurich. The conclusions remain the same.
Our conclusions are robust over several specifications
tests. Still, we can not preclude the possibility that phy-
sicians who currently dispense might react differently to
the incentives posed by dispensing than other physicians.
If this bias exists, it most likely leads to an overes-
timation of the effects of physician dispensing in this
study because physicians who are most likely to profit
from dispensing select into regions and settings where
regulations allows it.
Several strengths and limitations of our study have to be
taken into account. The main strength is that the study was
based on very comprehensive and practice-based health
care claims data which covers a large population-based in-
dividuals. The study also has several limitations. First, our
data did not embed information on clinical variables as well
as further patient characteristics like employment, income,
civil status and therefore potential confounding factors
exist. Although our analyses were adjusted for numerous
proxy variables indicating patients’ morbidity (costs in the
previous year and pharmaceutical cost groups) and health
insurance coverage, our information on the overall health
status and socio-economic status are limited. Second, data
may be underestimated since approximately 1.5 % of all
claims invoices were not reimbursed by the health insurer
and paid out-of-pocket by the individual patient. A third
limitation of the study is that our estimates are not entirely
representative of the general population in the canton of
Zurich. However, this study is based on a widespread health
care claims database including a large population from the
health insurer with the highest market coverage in Zurich.
Lastly, this study covers an observation period starting 8
months after legal frame changed in May 2012, which
might not be sufficient enough to capture potential physi-
cians’ behaviour change in terms of PD.
Conclusions
Recent health care reforms in several countries have
addressed the separation of labour between prescribers
and sellers of drugs. For example, Taiwan and South
Korea both passed reforms limiting the rights of phy-
sicians to dispense drugs, while on the other side of the
pacific ocean, Canada or the US have recently expanded
the rights of pharmacists to prescribe. In this context, it
is important to analyze the differences between non-
dispensing and dispensing prescribers of drugs.
This article sheds new light on the issue by analyzing
data from the Swiss canton of Zurich. The canton of
Zurich lends itself to analysis because many dispensing and
non-dispensing physicians exist in an otherwise similar
setting. From theoretical considerations and the existing
literature, we stated three hypotheses. First, physician
dispensing is expected to lead to higher drug quantities
because physicians earn income from drug mark-ups.
Second, physician dispensing is expected to be associated
with a higher use of generic drugs because physicians are
more aware of drug prices and can earn higher mark-ups
with generic drugs (the latter is due to the Swiss regulation
of drug prices). Third, with physicians’ earnings increased
by dispensing, we expect an increase in the supply of
ambulatory physician services.
Analyzing a large dataset of patient-level claims data,
we could not reject any of the three hypotheses. Patients
who buy their drugs mainly from physicians are found
to use more active agents on average during the obser-
vation period, and to use generic drugs more frequently.
In addition, physician dispensing was associated with an
increased number of physician visits per patients. We also
analyzed the effect of physician dispensing on expenditure
and found it to be associated with lower drug expen-
ditures per patient, but higher expenditures for ambula-
tory physician consultations. In terms of total health care
expenditure, we did not find a significant association of
physician dispensing.
This analysis offers insights for policy makers who are
(re-)considering the separation between drug prescribing
and dispensing, either by allowing physicians to dispense
or pharmacists to prescribe certain drugs. In terms of total
health care expenditures, we find no difference between
the two systems, so we are doubtful that changing dis-
pensing rights are a good measure to contain cost, at least
in Switzerland. What we do find is an increased supply of
ambulatory physicians services due to physician dispen-
sing, which might or might not be desired politically. To
know which system benefits patients more, an analysis of
the impact of physician dispensing on medical outcomes
would be necessary, which was beyond the scope of this
study but is addressed in other recent research.
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